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PART 1
Do Investors Care 
About Noise Trader 
Risk?
Abstract
The link between investor sentiment and asset valuation is 
at the center of a long-running debate in behavioral finance. 
Using a new composite sentiment indicator, we show that 
the conventional risk does not explain the abnormal returns 
of portfolios most sensitive to the sentiment factor. Our re-
sult supports the existence of a sentiment risk valued by fi-
nancial markets. We also find that the firms more impacted 
by the sentiment risk correspond to difficult-to-arbitrage 
and hard-to-value stocks, e.g. small stocks, growth stocks, 
young stocks, unprofitable stocks, lower dividend-paying 
stocks, intangible stocks and high volatility stocks. 
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Introduction 
The standard risk-based asset pricing literature does not take into con-
sideration the role of cognitive factors in financial markets. According to 
classical finance theory, investors are supposed to be Bayesian in form-
ing fully rational expectations about future cash flows and investment 
risks. As a result the equilibrium asset price reflects the fundamental val-
ue, i.e. rationally-discounted value of expected cash flows. The classical 
theory further recognizes that some investors cannot be rational, arguing 
that their positions are offset by arbitrageurs bringing prices back to their 
fundamental value. 
The succession of numerous stock market anomalies1 has led to an alter-
native theory stating that asset prices are established through the dynamic 
interplay between noise traders and rational investors. Several theoretical 
studies have modeled the role of investor sentiment in asset pricing [Black 
(1986), De Long et al. (1990), Barberis et al. (1998)]. In these models, there 
are two types of investors that interact: rational investors and noise traders 
(i.e. individuals). Rational investors have rational expectations about asset 
returns. In contrast, noise traders’ expectations about asset returns are 
subject to the influence of sentiment; they underestimate the expected re-
turns (relative to the fundamental value) in some periods and overestimate 
them in others. Each period, rational investors and noise traders trade the 
assets based on their respective beliefs. The theoretical framework as-
sumes that noise traders’ sentiment is stochastic and cannot be perfectly 
forecasted by rational investors. Because assets are risky and all investors 
are risk averse, the equilibrium price reflects the opinions of both the ratio-
nal investors and the noise traders. It follows that noise traders’ sentiment 
influences asset prices. The theoretical studies point out that asset prices 
can significantly diverge from fundamental values. Moreover, because ar-
bitrage has practical limits, rational investors fail to fully offset the effects 
of noise traders’ sentiment. Thus, the “noise trader risk”, also known as 
the “sentiment risk”, becomes a priced factor by stock markets. As noted 
by De Long et al., (1990), “Noise traders can earn higher relative expected 
returns solely by bearing more of the risk they themselves create.”
In financial markets, noise traders limit arbitrageurs’ ability to bring prices 
to their fundamental value. Not knowing what the reaction of noise trad-
ers will be, arbitrageurs understand risk is involved and limit the funds 
committed. For example, suppose that in a given period, the noise trad-
ers’ optimistic expectations result in asset prices inflation. Rational inves-
tors should theoretically react to this situation by using futures market 
to sell short these overvalued stocks. However, arbitrageurs could still 
experience a severe loss if prices increase instead of dropping because 
noise traders have continued to be too optimistic. Conversely, an inves-
tor who purchases these stocks thinking they are undervalued runs the 
risk that noise traders’ pessimistic expectations result in lower prices. In 
this case, the risk of holding stocks comes from two sources: the tradi-
tional risk and additional risk introduced by noise traders. 
While theoretical models early on incorporated the existence of noise 
traders into equilibrium asset pricing, few empirical tests have been 
undertaken to investigate the relationship between stock returns and 
sentiment risk. Furthermore, the studies often led to mitigated results. 
Some studies provide powerful and consistent empirical support for the 
hypothesis that stock prices are affected by sentiment risk [Lee et al. 
(1991), Lee et al. (2002), Kumar and Lee (2006)]. Other studies show that 
financial markets do not price cognitive factors [Elton et al. (1998), Sias 
et al. (2001), Glushkov (2006)]. 
This paper investigates two important questions. Is sentiment risk valued 
by the stock market? If so, what are the characteristics of the firms most 
concerned by the sentiment risk? Our main contributions, consistent 
with the predictions of models based on noise-trader sentiment, can be 
summarized along three dimensions. First, we develop a new composite 
sentiment indicator by combining several well-known direct and indirect 
sentiment indicators. The eyeball test reveals that our composite senti-
ment index produces a faithful reproduction of the bubbles and crashes 
during our study period, i.e. July 1981 to December 2008. For instance, 
our composite index records a significant decline when the speculative 
bubble of October 1987 burst. Between 1998 and 2003, it peaks in March 
2000 at the beginning of the internet bubble. Significant decreases are 
also recorded during the market collapse following the subprime crises.
Second, we implement a trading strategy that consists of buying stocks 
most impacted by the sentiment factor and selling stocks less impacted 
by the sentiment factor in the past 36 months. We find that such a strat-
egy can lead to a significant raw profit unexplained by traditional risk fac-
tors. Thus, the existence of a sentiment risk valued by financial markets 
is likely. 
Third, we find that the impact of sentiment risk on stock returns is not 
uniform across all stocks and is more associated with certain types of 
stock. We show that the effect of sentiment risk is more prominent for 
hard-to-value and difficult-to-arbitrage stocks, e.g. small stocks, growth 
stocks, young stocks, unprofitable stocks, lower dividend-paying stocks, 
intangible stocks and high volatility stocks. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The first section de-
scribes the sentiment measure employed in the study. The second sec-
tion exposes the methodology used to test the existence of sentiment 
risk priced by stock market. The third section presents the characteristics 
of the firms most affected by the sentiment risk. The fourth section in-
cludes our concluding remarks. 
1 For a detailed presentation about these anomalies see Schwert (2003). 
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Measuring investor sentiment 
The first step of our study is to measure the unobserved sentiment vari-
able. Investor sentiment can be defined as the degree of optimism or 
pessimism about future cash flows and investment risks that are not 
justified by the facts at hand. Several empirical studies have attempted 
to quantify investor sentiment. These studies employ two distinct ap-
proaches. The first approach uses several survey-based measures that 
directly ask individuals how they feel about current or future economic 
and stock market conditions. De Bondt (1993) uses the ratio of bullish 
to bearish responses surveyed by the American Association of Individual 
Investors. Clarke and Statman (1998) employ the Investors’ Intelligence 
survey data of bulls minus bears. Qiu and Welch (2006) recommend the 
use of the UBS/Gallup surveys. Zouaoui et al. (2011) focus on the index-
es of consumer confidence. The second approach draws on economic 
and market variables susceptible to capture the overall investors’ state of 
mind, such as closed end fund discount, number of IPOs, average first-
day returns on IPOs, mutual fund flows, aggregate trading volume and 
put/call ratio, among other.2 
It is important to note that there are no uncontroversial and universally 
accepted sentiment measures. Each individual measure has advantages 
and limitations. Surveys provide information about investors’ state of 
mind even without sophisticated financial theory to validate them. Notice, 
however, that survey responses are weighted equally regardless of the 
magnitude of funds managed by respondents and no distinction is made 
between the different degrees of optimism or pessimism expressed by 
respondents. On the other hand, indirect measures offer an excellent in-
dication of the power of market participants and the strength of their 
bullishness or bearishness. Yet, using economic and market data makes 
indirect measures very endogenous to the market and economic activity, 
so they may not measure exclusively investor sentiment. 
To sum up, it is difficult to use a unique indicator to measure investor sen-
timent. Each individual indicator could measure sentiment at a specific 
point in the market cycle, not necessarily during the sample period. The 
closed-end fund discount, for instance, will not be a worthwhile proxy if 
a large number of investors have come to prefer open-end funds. Dur-
ing some months, the number of IPOs might be equal to zero although 
the market is not necessarily at the lower level during the period stud-
ied. These considerations induce us to consider that the best empirical 
approach is to condense several imperfect indicators into an aggregate 
index. As a result, we build a new measure of sentiment by combining 
several well-known direct and indirect sentiment indicators. 
In this study, we focus on two direct sentiment indicators and four in-
direct sentiment indicators. Similar to Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007), 
we use principal component analysis to construct a composite senti-
ment index based on the common variation in six underlying proxies of 
investor sentiment identified in previous studies: the University of Michi-
gan consumer confidence index (UMI), the Investors Intelligence spread 
Bull-Bear (II), the number of IPOs in a given month (NIPO), the average 
monthly first-day returns on IPOs (RIPO), the net new cash flows of U.S. 
equity mutual funds (FLOW) and finally the closed-end fund discount 
(CEFD). All proxies are measured monthly over the period from June 1981 
to December 2008. Table 1 provides more details on the list of variables 
used for the construction of the composite sentiment index. 
The raw sentiment indicators encompass a psychological component 
related to sentiment and a rational component related to economic fun-
damentals. The bullishness or the bearishness of an investor can reflect 
rational future expectations or irrational enthusiasm or both. To isolate 
one aspect from the other, all sentiment measures are orthogonalized 
with respect to several contemporaneous economics variables. Similar to 
previous studies, we use data on growth of industrial production (IP), in-
flation (INF), term spread (TS), default spread (DS) and growth in durable 
(DC), nondurable (NDC) and services consumption (SC). The composite 
sentiment index (CSI) is as follows:
CSIt = 0.213 UMI
⊥
t + 0.197 II
⊥
t-1 + 0.201 NIPO
⊥
t + 0.189 RIPO
⊥
t-1 + 
0.238 FLOW⊥t-1 – 0.206 CEFD
⊥
t-1 (1)
Figure 1 shows the development of the composite sentiment index dur-
ing the period from July 1981 to December 2008. Our indicator produces 
a faithful reproduction of the bubbles and crashes during our study peri-
od. For instance, our composite index records a significant decline when 
the speculative bubble of October 1987 burst. Significant decreases are 
also seen during the collapse of the bonds market in 1994 and during the 
collapse of LTCM in 1998. Between 1998 and 2003, the composite index 
peaks in March 2000 at the beginning of the internet bubble. The index 
also decreases in 2008 during the so-called subprime crisis. This align-
ment is encouraging because it shows that our composite index captures 
major fluctuations in sentiment. 
The sentiment risk: myth or reality? 
To empirically test the hypothesis that the risk sentiment is priced by 
financial markets, we calculate the raw profit of a strategy consisting of 
buying portfolios of stocks with greater exposure to sentiment and selling 
portfolios of stocks with the lower exposure to sentiment. Stock returns 
and firm’s characteristics are collected from the merged CRSP-Compu-
stat database. To implement this strategy, each month we regress the 
monthly returns of each stock on the variations of composite sentiment 
indicator over the window [t-1, t-36], i.e.:
2 See Brown and Cliff (2004) and Baker and Wurgler (2007) for a detailed description of the 
various sentiment indicators. 
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Ri,t = ai + bi,tDCSIt + ei (2)
t = t-36,...t-1
We then use the absolute value of the estimated sentiment betas to clas-
sify the stocks each month into ten portfolios. Portfolio 1 includes the 
stocks least impacted by sentiment factor, and Portfolio 10 the stocks 
most impacted by sentiment factor. Finally, as the sentiment betas are 
estimated on a rolling basis of one month over the period August 1984 to 
December 2008, we investigate the sentiment portfolio returns on a hold-
ing horizon of a month. The monthly portfolio returns are calculated as a 
value-weighted average of all stocks in the portfolio. 
Findings are presented in Table 2. The portfolios of stocks the most sen-
sitive to sentiment have an average sentiment beta of 1.110, those in-
cluding the stocks the least sensitive to sentiment factor have an average 
sentiment beta of 0.017. With the exception of portfolio 5, the portfolio 
returns increase with the stock exposure to sentiment factor. Portfolio 1 
earns an average return of 0.95% and Portfolio 10 an average return of 
1.96%. Using Portfolio 1 as a benchmark, we continue our test of the sig-
nificance of the strategy sentiment.3 Specifically, we estimate the mean 
difference between the returns of Portfolio 10 and Portfolio 1, Portfolio 9 
and Portfolio 1, and so on. 
Results depicted in Table 2 show that the difference in mean returns be-
tween Portfolio 10 and Portfolio 1 is significant at the 5% level. It reaches 
1% per month, for annual raw profit of 12%. Results also show that the 
difference in mean returns between Portfolios 9 and 1 is significant at 
10%. The differences in mean returns for the other portfolios are not sig-
nificant at conventional levels. 
To sum up, the stocks that have higher exposure to sentiment factor 
earn greater returns than stocks with lower exposure to sentiment. No-
tice however, that these portfolios also have the highest traditional risk 
3 In the remainder of this paper, the strategy consisting of buying the stocks most influenced 
by the sentiment factor and selling the stocks least influenced by the sentiment factor will 
be referred to as the strategy sentiment. 
-5,0000
-4,0000
-3,0000
-2,0000
-1,0000
0,0000
1,0000
2,0000
3,0000
4,0000
Ju
l-
81
Ja
n-
83
Ju
l-
84
Ja
n-
86
Ju
l-
87
Ja
n-
89
Ju
l-
90
Ja
n-
92
Ju
l-
93
Ja
n-
95
Ju
l-
96
Ja
n-
98
Ju
l-
99
Ja
n-
01
Ju
l-
02
Ja
n-
04
Ju
l-
05
Ja
n-
07
Ju
l-
08
CSI
Crash 87
Bond 1994
Dot.com 2000
LTCM 98
Subprime 08
Figure 1 – The composite sentiment index
Code Variables Measures Sources
Investor sentiment indicators
UMI Consumer sentiment index Five questions making up the consumer sentiment index University of Michigan Survey 
Research Center
II Investors Intelligence index Bull minus bear spread Investors Intelligence
NIPO Number of IPOs Number of IPOs in a given month http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter
RIPO First-day returns on IPOs Average monthly first-day returns on IPOs http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter
FLOW Net new cash flows of U.S. equity mutual funds (Inflows-outflows)/Total asset Investment Company Institute
http://www.ici.org/index.html
CEFD Closed-end fund discount Equal-weighted average difference between the NAV of closed-
end fund and the stock price of fund
Wall Street Journal
CSI Composite sentiment index First component from the principal component analysis of six 
measures of sentiment
Macroeconomic variables
IP Growth of industrial production Change in the natural logarithm of industrial production index Federal Reserve system
INF Inflation Change in the natural logarithm of the consumer price Index Federal Reserve system
TS Term spread Difference between the yields on
10-year U.S. government bonds and 3-month Treasury bills
Federal Reserve system
DS Default spread Moody’s Baa-rated corporate bond yield less the Aaa-rated 
corporate bond yield
Datastream
DC, NDC and SC Growth of durable goods, non-durable goods and 
services consumption expenditures
Change in the natural logarithm of durable goods, non-durable 
and services consumption expenditures
Federal Reserve system
Table 1 – Description of the variables used for the construction of sentiment index
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Findings in Table 3 show high-adjusted R2 and a significant F-statistic of 
Gibbons et al. (1989). Findings also show that Portfolios 9 and 10 have 
the largest alpha coefficients and exhibit significant excess returns. The 
null hypothesis that the 10 constants are equal to zero is rejected at the 
threshold of 1%, allowing us to conclude that the risk premium for the 
stocks most exposed to sentiment is not justified by the traditional risk. 
Indeed, the abnormal returns of portfolios most sensitive to the sentiment 
factor cannot be explained by the three risk factors of Fama and French 
(1993), the momentum factor and the liquidity factor. 
Overall, we conclude that the traditional risk does not explain the abnor-
mal returns of portfolios most sensitive to the sentiment factor. Thus, a 
risk premium for the stocks most exposed to sentiment appears justified.
The characteristics of firms exposed to risk 
sentiment 
Which stocks are most affected by risk sentiment? Previous studies 
find that investor sentiment mainly affects the small capitalizations. The 
studies justify this result by the fact that individual investors concentrate 
their holding in small-capitalization stocks. Recently, Baker and Wurgler 
(2006, 2007) assert the effect of investor sentiment on stock returns is 
more prominent for certain categories of stocks. The authors consider 
that there are two conduits through which investor sentiment shapes the 
cross-section of stock prices. Under the first conduit, sentiment demand 
shocks vary across stocks while arbitrage is equally difficult across them. 
Defining investor sentiment as an appetite for speculation, investor senti-
ment will create higher demands resulting in higher returns for hard-to-
value stocks. The second conduit interprets sentiment as the degree of 
The Capco Institute Journal of Financial Transformation
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(market beta). This last observation makes us wonder. What can explain 
these high returns? A compensation for traditional risk bearing or a com-
pensation for the risk sentiment?
To address this question, we use the multifactor asset-pricing model of 
Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). In addition to liquidity, the model allows 
for the control of the market risk and the risks associated with firm size, 
the book-to-market ratio (B/M) and momentum. The model is presented 
in equation (3):
Rp,t – Rf,t = ap + bp(Rm,t – Rf,t) + spSMBt + hpHMLt + mpUMDt 
+ lpLIQt + ep (3)
Rp is the portfolio rate of return, Rf is the risk-free rate of return. Rm-Rf 
is the market return in excess of the risk-free rate (one-month bill rate). 
SMB is the difference between the value-weighted return of a portfolio of 
small stocks and the value-weighted return of a portfolio of large stocks. 
HML is the difference between the value-weighted return of a portfolio 
of high B/M stocks and the value-weighted return of a portfolio of low 
B/M stocks. UMD is the difference between the value-weighted return 
of a portfolio of stocks with high returns during months t-12 to t+2 and 
the value-weighted return of a portfolio of stocks with low returns during 
months t-12 to t+2. LIQ is the difference between the value-weighted 
return on the high liquidity sensitive portfolios and the value-weighted 
return on the low liquidity sensitive. The intercept, aP, measures the aver-
age monthly abnormal return. The monthly time series of theses factors 
are obtained from Ken French’s data library, with the exception of the 
liquidity factor which is obtained from Pastor and Stambaugh. 
Portfolios Mean Sentiment Beta Mean Market Beta Mean Returns The raw profits of sentiment strategies
Strategies Mean t-stat P-value
Portfolio 1: low exposition 0.017 0.903 0.0095 Portfolio 10 - Portfolio 1 0.010 1.803** 0.035
2 0.056 0.902 0.0102 Portfolio 9 - Portfolio 1 0.009 1.606* 0.054
3 0.097 0.934 0.0103 Portfolio 8 - Portfolio 1 0.006 0.892 0.186
4 0.142 0.897 0.0114 Portfolio 7 - Portfolio 1 0.005 0.823 0.205
5 0.193 0.943 0.0104 Portfolio 6 - Portfolio 1 0.002 0.817 0.207
6 0.254 0.949 0.0116 Portfolio 5 - Portfolio 1 0.000 0.754 0.225
7 0.322 1.002 0.0152 Portfolio 4 - Portfolio 1 0.001 0.664 0.253
8 0.435 1.112 0.0159 Portfolio 3 - Portfolio 1 0.000 0.400 0.344
9 0.601 1.379 0.0189 Portfolio 2 - Portfolio 1 0.000 0.264 0.395
Portfolio 10: high exposition 1.110 1.366 0.0196
This table reports some summary statistics of the sentiment portfolios and the raw profit of the sentiment strategy. The column titled Mean Sentiment (market) Beta represents the time series 
average of the cross-section of the mean of sentiment (traditional) beta coefficient of each portfolio. The average monthly return of each portfolio is presented in the column titled Mean Returns. 
Portfolio 1 contains the stocks least impacted by investor sentiment and Portfolio 10 the stocks the most impacted. This table also presents the raw profits for sentiment strategies, which consist of 
buying a portfolio exposed to the sentiment factor and selling the portfolio the least exposed to this factor. Portfolio 1 is used as a benchmark for the significance tests.  
The symbols ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Table 2 – Sentiment betas and the sentiment strategy
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optimism or pessimism about stocks in general. Sentiment is uniform but 
the difficulty of arbitrage differs among stocks. In this case, sentiment will 
have a stronger effect on stocks that tend to be riskier and more costly 
to arbitrage. Note that the same stocks that are difficult to arbitrage also 
tend to be hard to value. 
Following Baker and Wurgler (2006), we consider the following firm 
characteristics: size, growth potential and distress, age, profitability, 
dividend policy, tangibility and arbitrage costs. Size is the market capi-
talization measured as price times shares outstanding from CRSP. The 
firm’s growth potential and distress characteristics include the book-to-
market computed as the book value reported anytime during the fiscal 
year t divided by market value at the end of the calendar year. Age is the 
number of months since the firm’s first appearance on the CRSP tapes. 
Profitability is captured by the return on assets defined as the earnings 
divided by total assets. Asset tangibility is captured by property, plant 
and equipment over total assets. Dividend policy is dividends per share 
at the ex date, multiplied by Compustat shares outstanding, divided by 
book equity. Arbitrage costs are measured by idiosyncratic volatility mea-
sured by the standard deviation of residuals (over 60 months preceding 
month t) in the regression of individual stock returns on Fama and French 
(1993) risk factors. 
Our methodology helps us to answer this question. In December of each 
year t, we rank all stocks by the ascending absolute value of the senti-
ment betas and group them into 10 portfolios. Companies for which data 
are missing in any year t are excluded from the ranking for that specific 
year. We calculate the cross-section mean of each characteristic in every 
portfolio. The portfolios are then rebalanced every year in December and 
we form time series of the cross-section mean of each characteristic for 
the 10 portfolios over the period December 1984 to December 2008. 
Table 4 reports the time series average of the cross-section mean of each 
characteristic. We find a negative correlation between exposure to the 
sentiment factor and market capitalization. The stocks most exposed to 
sentiment have a small market capitalization. Those stocks evidence an 
Portfolios Alpha Rm-Rf SMB HML UMD LIQ Adjusted R²
1 Low exposition -0.003
(-0.942)
0.979 
(29.601)***
-0.098 
(-2.428)***
0.021 
(0.544)
-0.081 
(-3.123)*** 
-0.087
(1.897)*
0.886
2 -0.003 
(-0.828)
0.943 
(31.928)***
-0.082 
(-2.415)***
0.293 
(6.653)***
-0.038 
(-1.720)* 
-0.062
(1.564)
0.853
3 -0.000 
(-0.982)
0.992 
(31.772)***
-0.062 
(-1.402)
0.131 
(2.552)***
-0.062 
(-1.418)
0.058
(1.237)
0.843
4 -0.000 
(-0.291)
0.996 
(28.005)*** 
-0.082 
(-1.998)** 
0.162 
(3.304)*** 
0.017 
(0.501) 
0.056
(1.134)
0.813
5 -0.000 
(-0.423)
0.994 
(34.347)***
-0.121 
(-3.345)***
0.301 
(4.456) ***
-0.088 
(-1.345)
0.044
(1.145)
0.899
6 0.000 
(0.872)
0.916 
(32.089)***
-0.153 
(-3.934)***
0.062 
(0.939)
-0.015 
(-0.934)
0.028
(1.092)
0.867
7 0.002 
(1.412)
1.064 
(33.234)***
-0.184 
(-5.073)***
-0.047 
(-0.103)
-0.122 
(-3.963)***
-0.022
(-0.937)
0.869
8 0.003 
(1.425)
1.063 
(30.637)***
0.012 
(0.234)
-0.182 
(-3.735)***
0.005 
(1.658)*
-0.066
(-1.864)*
0.859
9 0.006 
(2.494)***
1.244 
(20.564)***
0.316 
(5.093)***
-0.284 
(-3.112)***
-0.023 
(-0.645)
-0.089
(-1.897)*
0.789
10 High exposition 0.007 
(3.156)** 
1.198 
(21.738)*** 
0.184 
(1.982)** 
-0.321 
(-4.222) *** 
0.012 
(0.319)
-0.949
(-2.012)**
0.802
FGRS = 2.763 P-value GRS = 0.0028
This table reports the factor model estimates for the 10 sentiment portfolios. The multi-factor model is as follows:
Rp,t – Rf,t = ap + bp(Rm,t – Rf,t) + spSMBt + hpHMLt + mpUMDt + lpLIQt + ep
Rp is the portfolio rate of return. Rf is the risk-free rate of return. Rm-Rf is the market return in excess of the risk-free rate (one-month bill rate). SMB is the difference between the value-weighted 
return of a portfolio of small stocks and the value-weighted return of a portfolio of large stocks. HML is the difference between the value-weighted return of a portfolio of high B/M stocks and the 
value-weighted return of a portfolio of low B/M stocks. UMD is the difference between the value-weighted return of a portfolio of stocks with high returns during months t-12 to t+2 and the value-
weighted return of a portfolio of stocks with low returns during months t-12 to t+2. And ep is the residual return on the portfolio. LIQ is the difference between the value-weighted return on the high 
liquidity sensitive portfolios and the value-weighted return on the low liquidity sensitive portfolios. The Newey-West adjusted t-values of the coefficient estimates are reported in the parentheses.  
The FGRS is the F-statistic of Gibbons, Ross and Shanken (1989) testing the null hypothesis that the intercepts are jointly zero.  
The symbols ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Table 3 – Regression of monthly excess returns on portfolio risk factors of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003)
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average size four times smaller than the stocks least exposed to senti-
ment. This difference in size is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
This result is consistent with that of most empirical studies showing that 
investor sentiment impacts principally the performance of stocks mainly 
held by individuals.
Note also that the stocks most exposed to sentiment are growth stocks, 
young stocks, less profitable stocks, less tangible stocks, and low-paying 
dividend stocks. These stocks also exhibit high idiosyncratic volatility. On 
average stocks in Portfolio 10 have a book-to-market ratio 10% smaller 
than the stocks in Portfolio 1. These stocks are about two years younger, 
approximately four times less profitable, 24% less tangible and pay four 
times less dividends than stocks in Portfolio 1. These stocks also display 
three times more idiosyncratic volatility than the stocks in Portfolio 1. All 
tests of difference in average characteristics between Portfolio 10 and 
Portfolio 1 are statistically significant at least at the 10% level.
Overall, our main finding supports the hypothesis that stocks that are 
hard to value and difficult to arbitrage are more vulnerable to the risk 
sentiment. Similar to the literature, we find that the stocks most vulner-
able to sentiment factor are small stocks, growth stocks, young stocks, 
unprofitable stocks, intangible stocks, lower dividend-paying stocks and 
high idiosyncratic volatility stocks. 
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Conclusion 
Testing if the sentiment risk is priced by the stock market is an empirical 
challenge. This study tests the hypothesis that the risk introduced by 
noise traders in the financial markets may not be diversifiable, because 
their views are correlated and affect many assets. We first develop a new 
measure of sentiment by combining six traditional measures of sentiment 
using principal component analysis. An eyeball test shows that our com-
posite sentiment index produces a faithful reproduction of the bubbles 
and crashes during our study period. We then implement a strategy that 
consists of buying stocks with the higher exposure to sentiment and sell-
ing stocks with the lower exposure to sentiment. Findings show that the 
stocks that have higher exposure to the sentiment factor earn greater re-
turns than stocks with lower exposure to sentiment. Exploring the sourc-
es of profit, we show that traditional risk does not explain the high returns 
of portfolios most affected by the sentiment factor. We finish our study 
by re-identifying the characteristics of firms exposed to risk sentiment. 
Consistent with the predictions of models based on noise-trader senti-
ment, our results show that the stocks that are hard to value and difficult 
to arbitrage are more vulnerable to the risk sentiment. Future research 
should focus on developing a model that includes a risk premium linked 
to investor’s psychology.
Portfolios Size (millions $) Book-to-market Age (months) Profitability Tangibility Dividend policy Arbitrage costs
1 Low exposition 2058.995 1.403 160.573 0.085 0.331 0.228 0.0136
2 2047.35 1.438 160.510 0.063 0.326 0.198 0.0136
3 2026.715 1.427 161.360 0.039 0.322 0.132 0.0147
4 2010.865 1.460 160.194 0.031 0.321 0.131 0.0154
5 1927.19 1.440 159.165 0.022 0.319 0.090 0.0167
6 1924.33 1.421 157.249 0.026 0.306 0.077 0.019
7 1902.92 1.402 155.172 0.023 0.299 0.036 0.021
8 1703.18 1.378 151.287 0.0218 0.287 0.039 0.025
9 1213.695 1.432 146.817 0.020 0.261 0.022 0.032
10 High exposition 475.5 1.269 137.857 0.018 0.251 0.019 0.058
Portfolio 10 - Portfolio 1 -1583.5 -0.134 -22.716 -0.067 -0.08 -0.209 0.044
t-stat -7.978*** -1.333* -2.286** -2.098** -5.345*** -2.811*** 6.043***
This table reports the time series average of the cross-section mean of each sentiment portfolio characteristic. Size is the market capitalization measured as price times shares outstanding from 
CRSP. The firm’s growth potential and distress characteristic are included. The book-to-market is computed as the book value reported anytime during the fiscal year t divided by market value 
at the end of the calendar year. Age is the number of months since the firm’s first appearance on the CRSP tapes. Profitability is captured by the return on assets defined as the earnings divided 
by total assets. Asset tangibility is captured by property, plant and equipment over total assets. Dividend policy is dividends per share at the ex date multiplied by Compustat shares outstanding, 
divided by book equity. Arbitrage costs are measured by idiosyncratic volatility measured by the standard deviation of residuals (over 60 months preceding month t) in the regression of individual 
stock returns on Fama and French (1993) risk factors. The last line depicts the Student t-test of mean differences.  
The symbols ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Table 4 – The characteristics of firms exposed to sentiment risk
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